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Challenging China's Fixed Exchange Rate
Regime: An Analysis of U.S. Options
By XINCHEN SOFIA LOU*

I. Introduction
Since mid-2003, the value of the renminbi (RMB), China's
currency, has been a point of contention in U.S.-China trade
relations. China has pegged the value of the RMB to the U.S. dollar
for a decade, at a fixed exchange rate of about 8.27 RMB to a dollar.
The Chinese government has exercised strict control over trading of
the RMB to maintain its value within a small range around the fixed
rate. Although the United States was not the first to single out the
fixed value of the RMB and China's tight monetary control policy as
an unfair trade practice, it has assumed a leadership role in calling on
China to change its policy.
Several factors helped focus American attention on this issue.
First of all, the U.S.-China trade deficit reached $124 billion in 2003,
outstripping all other U.S. trade deficits
Secondly, the U.S.
economy has continued shedding jobs since 2000, and the
manufacturing sector is especially hit hard with an estimated 3 million
jobs lost by 2003. 3 Thirdly, the U.S. dollar has depreciated against
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005; B.A.
Oberlin College. The author would like to thank her husband for his support in this
endeavor.
1. As early as 2001, Japan has argued that the RMB was undervalued and was
giving Chinese exporters an unfair advantage in world markets. See Paul Wiseman,
China's Currency Flexes Its Muscle, USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2001, at 5B.
2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
&
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES - ANNUAL REVISION FOR 2003 18-

22
(2004),
available
at
<www.census.gov/foreign-trade/PressRelease/2003pr/final revisions/exhl3tl.pdf>.
3. H.R. Comm. on International Relations, Hearing on U.S.-China Ties:
Reassessing the Economic Relationship, 110th Cong. 1st sess. (Oct. 21, 2003)
(testimony of Franklin J. Vargo, Vice President, International Economic Affairs,

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 28: 3

other major currencies, which should make U.S. exports more
competitive. Yet, because the RMB is pegged to the dollar, its value

in many markets also went down, making Chinese exports more
competitive as well, thereby minimizing any advantage U.S. products
might have gained in world markets.

Many academics, including economists and legal scholars, have
weighed in on the issue of China's currency control, though there is
no agreement over what, if anything, should be done about the value
of the RMB. Some have argued that the RMB is undervalued by 40

percent which causes an increase in the U.S. trade deficit of $50
billion or more per year.' They call for an upward revaluation of the
RMB of about 20 percent to bring it closer to a market-based level.6
Others have dismissed such claims as "dead wrong," arguing that

China is right in maintaining fixed currency control because China's
competitive advantage lies primarily in labor costs, technology,
quality control, and infrastructure; floating the currency would expose
China to a host of economic problems, including higher
unemployment and bank failures
Though economists could argue endlessly about what the RMB's
value should be, the economic and political reality in the United

States is such that a broad coalition of interested parties has formed
to seek ways to pressure China to change its currency policy. Some
industry associations are considering petitioning the U.S. government
to investigate China's "unfair trade practice." 8 Others point to past
at
Association
of
Manufacturers),
National
<wwwa.house.gov/international-relations/108/varglO2l.htm> (visited Mar. 6, 2004).
4. In the twelve months from January 2003 to January 2004, the U.S. dollar has
lost nearly twenty-five percent of its value against the Euro. See Adam Shell, Stocks
Fly High as DollarHits Lows, USA TODAY, Jan. 12, 2004, at lB.
5. See e.g. Morris Goldstein & Nicholas Lardy, A Modest Proposalfor China's
Renminbi, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 26, 2003, at 17; Ernest H. Preeg, Speech, Chinese
Currency Manipulation and the U.S. Trade Deficit (presented to U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, Sep. 25, 2003) (on file with the U.S.Security
Review
Commission),
at
China
Economic
and
<www.uscc.gov/researchreports/2000_2003/reports/preeg.htm> (visited Mar. 6, 2004).
6. Id.
7. See e.g. Stephen Roach, The Scapegoating of China, Morgan Stanley Global
available
at
Economic
Forum
(Jul.
14,
2003),
Joseph Stiglitz,
<www.morganstanley.com/GEFdata/digests/20030714-mon.html>;
First Japan, Now China is the Culprit, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Oct. 15, 2003, §
at
26,
available
at
Guardian
Leader
Pages,
<www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1063086,00.html>.
8. In January 2004, the Fair Currency Alliance, a group consists of
manufacturing, agricultural, and labor associations, announced its plan to petition the
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successes in waging antidumping complaints against imports.
Congressmen from traditional industrial states have introduced bills

and resolutions that would impose across-the-board sanctions against
Chinese imports.9

This note will start by briefly describing the currency control
system in China and its effect on international trade, particularly as it
relates to the United States. Next, the note will examine the various

legal alternatives the United States may unilaterally adopt against
China and their likely effectiveness. The note will then consider the
dispute settlement mechanism provided by international trade
organizations as an alternative to unilateral actions by the United
States. Finally, the note will assess the role of legal actions in
resolving complex trade disputes.
H. China's Fixed Exchange Rate and Currency Control System
The RMB is issued and controlled solely by the People's Bank of

China (PBOC), the central bank of China. It is not freely traded in
the global currency market. In 1994, China established its existing

"managed float" foreign exchange control system."0 In addition to

giving PBOC the authority to decide and issue the daily exchange
rates of the RMB, an inter-bank foreign exchange market was formed

to provide some visibility into the market supply and demand for the
currency." Membership on the foreign exchange market is limited to
a select number of authorized foreign exchange banks and financial
institutions." Every day, the PBOC announces the base exchange

rates against four major currencies, the U.S. dollar, the Euro, the Hong

current administration to open a Section 301 investigation into China's currency
manipulation. See Christopher S. Rugaber, China Currency Revaluation Necessary to
Stop Protectionist Backlash, Vargo Says, 21 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 319
(Feb.19, 2004).
9. For example, six senators, from the states of New York, Illinois, South
Carolina and Kentucky, jointly introduced S.B. 1586 to authorize a 27.5 percent duty
on all Chinese imports if "the negotiations with [China] regarding China's
undervalued currency and currency manipulation are not successful." S.B. 1586,
180th Cong. 1st Sess. (Sep. 5, 2003).
10. See Larry L. Drumm, Changing Money: Foreign Exchange Reform in the
People's Republic of China, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 359, 384-386
(Winter 1995).
11. See State Administration of Foreign Exchange, About SAFE: A Historical
View of the Development of China's Foreign Exchange Control, at
<www.safe.gov.cn/0430/js-tzyg.htm> (in Chinese) (visited Mar. 6, 2004).
12. See id. at § 36.
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Kong dollar, and the Japanese Yen." The member banks must trade
rates.14
the RMB within a small band around the announced exchange
In addition to controlling the exchange rate, the State Council
introduced the Rules on Foreign Exchange Control in 1996 which

imposed stringent procedures for businesses and individuals to
convert RMB into foreign currency.'5 For example, the prohibition of
any pricing and settlement of accounts in foreign currency is
applicable to all individuals and businesses within China, including

foreign exchange revenues and expenditures of foreign operations in
China. 16 The Rules also require foreign exchange earnings of China-

based organizations (including foreign investment enterprises),
whether through regular trade projects or capital investment projects,
be remitted back into China and deposited in authorized foreign
exchange banks, and that these organizations may not make

unauthorized deposits of foreign exchange outside Chinese territory
in violation of relevant State regulations. 7
Since 1996, China has adopted Article VIII of the International
Monetary Fund's Articles of Agreement, which establishes current

account convertibility,'" meaning that the RMB is freely convertible
"for purposes of trade in goods and services" as long as the
However, capital
underlying transactions are legally valid. 9

transactions remain subject to strict controls to protect against
unforeseeable swings in capital flows in and out of the country which
could dramatically affect PBOC's ability to control both interest rates

and exchange rates."
These rules put up road blocks for transferring foreign currencies

13. See The People's Bank of China Directive on Management of RMB
Exchange Rates, No. 26, promulgated on Mar. 23, 1995, available at
<www.safe.gov.cn/law/law167.htm> (in Chinese).
14. See id.
15. See The Rules on Foreign Exchange Control, Directive No. 193 of the State
Council of the PRC (1996) (amended on Jan. 14, 1997 in accordance with State
Council Decision to Revise the Rules), available at <www.safe.gov.cn/law/lawl.htm>
(in Chinese).
16. See id. at §§ 4,7.
17. See id. at §§ 9, 10, 19, 52.
18. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund [hereinafter
IMF Articles], 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, Art. VIII (1944) (as amended through
June 28, 1990), available at <www.imf.orglexternal/pubs/ft/aalaaO8.htm#2>.
19. Christopher H. Stephens, Policy Collisions-China's Banking Reforms
Require Dramatic,120 BANKING L.J. 34, 39-40 (January 2003).
20. Id. at 40.
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out of China by foreign companies doing business there as well as
Chinese companies seeking to expand overseas. Though the Chinese
government appears to recognize the need to follow international

norms in adopting liberal currency policies and has expressed a desire
to eventually float the RMB,21 it has taken only cautious steps in
loosening control.
It is widely accepted that the stability of the RMB has
contributed to the growth of the Chinese economy, which has

remained at a rate of 7.1 percent or more annually for the last
decade.' As foreign investments have poured in, China has become a
manufacturing center, exporting low-cost, labor-intensive goods
around the world, and in the process accumulating a huge foreign
exchange reserve. By the end of June 2004, the Chinese foreign
exchange reserve had reached US$470 billion, more than double the
amount of US$155 billion in 1999.24

IIl. Arguments against China's Fixed Exchange Rate Practice
China's emergence as a manufacturing center has caused alarm
in other countries because companies are moving plants to China,
removing jobs from local markets. A wide range of interested parties
in the United States, including the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission (ESRC), manufacturing sector representatives,
and labor unions, all assign some blame to China for the millions of
jobs lost in recent years.
The ESRC was created by Congress in 2000 to "monitor,
21. Michael A. Lev, U.S. Urges Beijing to Unlock Currency, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Sept. 3, 2003, at A3.
22. One such measure is the establishment of an offshore RMB market in Hong
Kong in February 2004. See Joseph Yam, Chief Executive, Hong Kong Monetary
Authority, Renminbi Business, ECONOMIC FORUM,
Mar. 4, 2004, at
<www.tdctrade.com/econforum/hkma/hkma04030l.htm>
(visited Mar. 6, 2004).
However, "the RMB business is restricted to individual customers, with deposit
business offered solely to Hong Kong residents, excluding business entities and nonresidents," unlike offshore business for other currencies that "targets companies and
institutions as well, with non-residents as major customers." Hui Wing Fu, Hong
Kong's Prospects as an Offshore Renminbi Centre, ECONOMIC FORUM, Dec 1, 2003, at
<www.tdctrade.com/econforum/boc/boc03l2Ol.htm> (visited Mar. 6, 2004).
23. World
Bank,
China
Economic
Indicators,
at
<www.worldbank.org.cn/English/Content/ChinaEI.pdf> (last updated Sept. 17, 2004)
(visited Oct. 22, 2004).
24. People's Bank of China, Reports and Statistics, Gold & Foreign Exchange
Reserves Data for 1999 and 2004, at <www.pbc.gov.cn/diaochatongji/tongjishuju> (in
Chinese) (visited Oct. 22, 2004).
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investigate, and report to Congress on the national security
implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship"
between the United States and China.25 In 2003, after holding
extensive hearings, the ESRC concluded that the RMB is artificially
undervalued. 26 The relatively cheap RMB has negatively impacted
the competitiveness of U.S. manufactured goods and contributed to a
migration of world manufacturing capacity to China and to an erosion
of the U.S. manufacturing base.27 It recommended that Congress use
its legislative powers to "force action by the U.S. and Chinese
Governments to address China's unfair and mercantilist trade
practice. ' 28
Representatives from the manufacturing sector believe that the
current economic slowdown is essentially a manufacturing recession
because over 90 percent of total job losses since 2000 in the United
States have occurred in the manufacturing sector. 29 Because of the
huge and still growing trade deficit, they have singled out China as
both a threat and an opportunity for U.S. manufacturers. 30 They
believe that the RMB is undervalued, which contributes to the
growing imports from China. 1 On the other hand, they note that
"less than 10 percent of China's imports come from the United
States," so there is greater potential for growth. 32 Again, if the RMB
appreciates against the dollar, more U.S. goods will be exported to
China because they will be cheaper.
The largest labor union in the United States, the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFLCIO), also argues that the Chinese government has manipulated and
undervalued its currency.33 It believes this has negatively affected

25. Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-398, § 1, 114 Stat. 1654 (2000) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7002 (2001).
26. H.R. Comm. on Ways and Means, Hearingon United States-China Economic
Relations and China's Role in the Global Economy, 110th Cong. 1st session (Oct. 30,
2003) (statement of Roger W. Robinson, Jr., Chairman, U.S.-China Economic &
at
Commission),
Review
Security
<www.uscc.gov/hearings/2003hearings/written-testimonies/031030bios/031030stateme
ntchairmanrobinson.htm> (visited Mar. 6, 2004).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. H.R. Comm. on International Relations, supra note 3.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. H.R. Comm. on International Relations, Hearing on U.S.-China Ties:
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American workers, contributing to almost 3 million manufacturing
jobs lost since 1998, including 431,000 in the first nine months of
2003.34 The AFL-CIO wants U.S. lawmakers to focus their attention
on policies that are "feasible, quick, and will begin to ameliorate the

job losses."35 It asserts that the Chinese government has flouted its
international obligations with respect to currency values and thus
compels the U.S. government to make correcting this issue as a top
priority. 36

Congressional representatives are typically responsive to their
constituencies. The current administration, on the other hand, has

been hesitant in initiating a formal negotiation with China because

China has clearly indicated an unwillingness to compromise.37 In
October 2003, the Treasury Department issued a report to Congress
entitled InternationalEconomic and Exchange Rate Policies.38 While

in this report the Treasury Department renewed the call for China to
move to a flexible exchange rate system, it concluded that China did

not meet the technical requirements for currency manipulation under
U.S. law or international standards. 39 The report was met with cries
of disappointment by lawmakers who vowed to keep up the pressure
on the administration and to get the proposed China-related bills

passed in order to punish China for its unfair practice. '

Reassessing the Economic Relationship, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 21, 2003)
(testimony of Thea M. Lee, Assistant Director of Public Policy, American Federation
at
Organizations),
Industrial
of
Congress
and
Labor
of
<wwwa.house.gov/internationalrelations/108/leelO2l.htm> (visited Mar. 6, 2004).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. During an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in October 2003, the
Chinese President, Hu Jingtao, stated that "China would maintain the basic stability
of the Chinese currency RMB at a reasonable and balanced level." People's Daily,
President Hu Reiterates Stance on RMB Valuation (Oct. 19, 2003), at
(last modified
<english.peopledaily.com.cn/200310/19/eng20031019_126338.shtml>
Oct. 19, 2003) (visited Mar. 6, 2004).
38. Treasury Department, Report to Congress on International Economic and
Exchange Rate Policies, at <www.treas.gov/press/releases/js954.htm> (last updated
Oct. 30,2003) (visited Mar. 6,2004).
39. Id.
40. Geoff Earle, As Lawmakers Count Job Losses, More of Them are Turning a
Baleful Eye on China's $102 Billion Trade Surplus,THE HILL, Nov. 5,2003, at 28.
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IV. Unilateral Legal Actions the United States May Adopt to
Justify Imposing Sanctions Against Chinese Imports
Currency control policy is traditionally a country's sovereign
issue, though international interference has become possible with the
advent of international trade law and enforcement mechanisms."
Since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, it
has assumed the legal obligation to abide by the WTO's substantive
and procedural rules. 2
As a founding member of the WTO, the United States has
codified most WTO agreements into law. In addition to invoking the
WTO jurisdiction, the United States has "retained investigatory
power independent of the WTO to determine trade imbalances."43
One example of the United States exercising such unilateral power
took place in March 2002, when the U.S. government imposed tariffs
of up to 30 percent on foreign steel entering into the U.S." Though
the tariffs were revoked in November 2003 after a WTO panel ruled
them illegal, the fact that they were imposed in the first place
illustrates that the United States believes this type of economic
sanction is an effective and persuasive tool in trade relations.
Therefore, the United States may unilaterally impose sanctions,
typically in the form of tariffs, under its trade law if it determines that
China has engaged in unfair trade practices. Below are some
unilateral legal approaches the United States may rely on to justify an
import tariff and an assessment of their likelihood of success.
A. Congressional Lawmaking

In September and October of 2003, nine bills were introduced in
41. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The InternationalMonetary System and the Erosion of
Sovereignty: Essay in Honor of Cynthia Lictenstein, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
257, 270 (Spring 2002) (noting that "the boundary between international and internal
concern seems to have largely disappeared" in the aftermath of the IMF bailout of
the Mexican peso crisis and Southeast Asian Financial Crisis).
42. WTO membership means a balance of rights and obligations. While the
members "enjoy the privileges that other member-countries give to them and the
security that the trading rules provide," in return, they had to make commitments to
open their markets and to abide by the rules - those commitments were the result of
the membership (or "accession") negotiations. See WTO, Understandingthe WTO:
Membership,
Alliances,
and
Bureaucracy,
at
<www.wto.orglenglish/thewtoe/whatise/tif e/org3_e.htm> (visited March. 3,2004).
43. Kevin K. Ho, Trading Rights and Wrongs: The 2002 Bush Steel Tariffs, 21
Berkeley J. Int'l L. 825, 837 (2003).
44. Id. at 832.
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the House and the Senate that addressed China's currency policy.4 5
These bills all express general concern regarding China's unfair
manipulation of currency value; encourage China to liberalize its
currency policy; and compel the Bush administration to engage China
on this topic. 46 Two bills, S.B. 1586 and H.R. 3364, go a step further in
calling for the imposition of across-the-board tariffs on Chinese
imports if negotiations to be conducted by the U.S. Treasury
Department fail to produce significant results within a fixed period.47
1. CurrentBills ProposingTariffs againstChina
S.B. 1586 and H.R. 3364 are essentially the same bill introduced
respectively in the Senate and the House. The bills state that the
RMB is "artificially pegged at a level significantly below its market
value... [by] an average of 27.5 percent. 4 8 This "undervaluation" of
the RMB results in "a significant subsidization of China's exports and
a virtual tariff on foreign imports, leading ... China to enjoy
significant trade surpluses with its international trading partners."'4 9
The bills charge that the Chinese government's intervention in the
currency market to keep the RMB value within an artificial trading
range "violates the spirit and letter of" the WTO . ° Noting that the
Chinese government has "failed to promptly address concerns raised
by the [U.S.]," the bills set a 180-day schedule for the administration
to negotiate with China on its currency policy and require
certification by the end of the 180-day period that China has adopted
a market-based currency policy." Finally, the bills declare that a duty
of 27.5 percent will be imposed on any import item from China if a
certification from Treasury is not made by the 180-day deadline. 2

45. H. Res. 414, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 28, 2003); H.R. 3364, 108th Cong. 1st
Sess. (October 21, 2003); Currency Harmonization Initiative through Neutralizing
Action Act of 2003, S.B. 1758, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 20, 2003); H.R. 3228, 108th
Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 2, 2003); S. Res. 219, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (Sep. 26, 2003); H.
Con. Res. 285, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (Sep. 17, 2003); H.R. 3058, 108th Cong. 1st Sess.
(Sep. 10, 2003); Fair Currency Enforcement Act of 2003, S. 1592, 108th Cong. 1st
Sess. (Sep. 8, 2003); S. 1586, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (Sep. 5, 2003).
46. See Id.
47. See S. 1586; H.R. 3364, supra note 46, at § 2.
48. Id.
49. Id., at § 1(2).
50. Id., at § 1(5).
51. Id., at § 1(6), 2(1).
52. Id., at § 2(1).
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2. Legal Basis for the Bills and Applicability to Chinese Currency
The bills cite Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade of 1994 (GATT), commonly known as the security
exception provision, as the legal basis for the proposed actions,53 and
state that "[p]rotecting the [U.S.] manufacturing sector is essential" to
its security interests.m Article XXI provides that any contracting
party (member of the WTO) may take actions which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, either
relating to "fissionable materials" or arms trafficking, or "taken in
time of war or other emergency in international relations."5 5
On its face, Article XXI does not support the expansive reading
of the term "essential security interests" by Congress. One principle
of contract interpretation is expressio unius exclusio alterius, meaning
"if one or more specific items are listed, without any more general or
56
inclusive terms, other items although similar in kind are excluded.
Here, Article XXI specifies three conditions under which a country
may act unilaterally and all three relate to national security concerns.
To read the Chinese currency value into this provision is to ignore the
specific conditions listed. Although there has been no previous
interpretation and application of Article XXI,57 the interpretation
adopted by Congress in these bills is unlikely to prevail in front of the
WTO body.
3. Outlook for CurrentBills
The legal basis for the proposed tariffs is weak, so it would not be
wise for Congress to adopt these bills. In reality, although these bills
have a lot of support by lawmakers from industrial states, they are

53. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified as amended as 19 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq. (1994)) (adopting General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade of 1994 [hereinafter "GATT 1994"], 33 I.L.M. 1143,
at
available
XXI
(1994),
art.
<www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/analytic-index-e/gatt1994_08_e.htm#articleX

XI>).
54. See S.B. 1586; H.R. 3364, supra note 45, at § 1(7).
55. See GATT 1994, art. XXI, § B, supra note 53 (noting "[n]o jurisprudence or
decision of a competent WTO body" under the heading "Interpretation and
at
XXI"),
of
Article
Application
<www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/analytic-index-e/gatt1994_08-e.htm#articleX
XI> (visited Mar. 6, 2004).
56. Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64
COLUM. L. R. 833, 853-854 (1964).
57. GATT 1994, art. XXI, supra note 53.
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unlikely to gather the majority needed for passage. In fact, in the
twelve months since introduction, these two bills have remained in
committee." Therefore, it is unlikely that these bills will become law
and have any effect on China.
B. Antidumping Actions
The United States has applied antidumping law to maintain "fair
pricing" of imports from abroad for almost a century. 9 Today, the
Tariff Act of 193r6 as amended incorporates the international
antidumping provisions and provides the legal basis for such
enforcement in the United States.
1. Anti-Dumping Rules
Dumping occurs when imported merchandise is sold below fair
value,61 causing material injury, or threatening to cause material
injury, to the domestic industry producing a comparable product. 6
The antidumping rules incorporate the GATT recognition of
dumping as an unfair trade practice. 63 The Trade Act provides that
the United States shall investigate possible dumping practices by
foreign companies and impose additional duties to offset any pricing
disadvantages suffered by domestic industry.6
Antidumping duty investigations may be initiated as a result of a
petition being filed by a domestic industry.65 The investigatory
responsibilities are shared between the U.S. Department of
Commerce (DOC) and the U.S. International Trade Commission
(ITC), with the DOC investigating whether sales are below fair
market value, and the ITC investigating whether there has been

58. See Thomas: U.S. Congress on the Internet, Bill Summary & Status for the
108th Congress, at <thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery> (visited Oct. 22, 2004).
59. Joseph A. Laroski, Jr., NMES: A Love Story, Nonmarket and Market
Economy Status under U.S. Antidumping Law, 30 L. & POLICY INTL Bus. 369, 372
(Winter 1999) (noting that the first antidumping law was enacted in 1916).
60. Tariff Act of 1930, June 17, 1930, ch 497, Title VII, Subtitle B, § 731 (1930)
(codified as amended as 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671 et seq. (2004)).
61. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (2004).
62. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (2004).
at
available
53,
supra note
VI,
art.
1994,
GATT
63. See
<www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/analytic-index-e/gatt1994-04-e.htm#articleVI
64. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671 et seq.
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a (2004).
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material injury to the U.S. industry."
The DOC compares the U.S. price of the subject good to the
normal value of the good in the foreign firm's domestic market or the
price of the good in a third market.67 If neither value is available, the
DOC will utilize a constructed value as normal value.6 On the other
hand, in determining injury, the ITC takes into account factors such
as profits, productivity, market share, depression of prices, volume of
imports, return on investment, and utilization of production
capacity.69
If both agencies make affirmative final determinations, the DOC
issues an antidumping duty order and imposes a duty in terms of
percentage equal to the average amount by which foreign market
value exceeds the U.S. price.0
2. Application to Chinese Imports
Chinese goods have been subject to antidumping challenges in
the United States since the early 1980s. In the first nine months of
2003, the United States initiated nine antidumping investigations
against Chinese products worth $980 million.
The products
investigated include crawfish tail meat, color television sets, ball
bearings, iron tables, persulfates, wooden furniture, and automotive
replacement windshields.
The DOC has treated China as a nonmarket economy (NME)
country in all antidumping investigations.7 3 In valuing factors for
producing goods imported from an NME, the DOC is directed to use
"the best available information regarding the values of such factors in
a market economy country or countries considered to be appropriate

66. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2004).
67. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A) (2004).
68. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18) (2004).
69. Id. at § 1677(7)(C) (2004).
70. 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
71. Guo Ji Jin Rong Bao (International Financial Daily), Zou Hua, China
Responds to Antidumping Investigation around the World and Initiates Some of Its
Own, at <www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/2216522.html> (last updated Nov. 28, 2003)
(in Chinese) (visited Mar. 6, 2004).
72. See USITC: Investigations under Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, at
<www.usitc.gov/7ops/7opsindex.htm> (visited Mar. 6,2004).
73. See Fuyao Glass Indus. Group Co. v. United States, 2003 Ct. Intl. Trade
LEXIS 171, at *6 (Dec. 18, 2003) ("As in previous investigations, Commerce treated
the PRC as a nonmarket economy ("NME") country.").
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by the administering authority. 7 4 More often than not, Chinese
goods are found to be sold below cost because of the price difference
between China and the surrogate country, thereby meeting the
antidumping criteria and resulting in tariffs being imposed.
One key factor in the DOC's NME determination is "the extent
to which the currency of the foreign country is convertible into the
currency of other countries."75 Thus, the non-convertibility of the
RMB has already hurt Chinese products in the antidumping duty
cases.
3. Applicability to Chinese Currency
There has not been an antidumping investigation against all
products from a single country based on the argument that the
currency value of that country helps keep import price below cost.
While this argument may have some merit, the nature of the
antidumping investigation seems ill suited for such an across-theboard exercise. Because the law requires that fair value and material
injury determinations be made for each imported good, and the
determinations involve exhaustive study of factors that go into the
production of the good, no generalization can be made on the pricing
of all goods from one country based solely on the value of that
country's currency. Even if such a generalization was made, it would
inevitably be rejected in court or in front of the WTO.
Furthermore, even if China's currency value is a dominant factor
in keeping price low for all Chinese imports, the DOC and the ITC
still have to conduct investigations into every single product coming
from China. This will be an enormous task and will not be feasible
given the limited government resources.
4. Prognosisfor Antidumping Law
While the antidumping law can be and has been used effectively
in protecting specific industries that are injured by dumping of
competing products from China, it does not provide a workable basis
for imposing duties against all Chinese imports.
C. Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
An alternative to counter unfair pricing of imports is the

74. Id. at *7 n.4 (quoting 19 U.S.C. §1677(c)(1)).
75. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B).
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countervailing duties law, also laid out in the Trade Act of 1930,
which focuses on subsidies to foreign producers by their
government. 76 In addition, the countervailing duties law incorporates
the GATT provisions on subsidies and countervailing duties."
1. Summary of CountervailingDuties Rule
The countervailing duties are applied when the United States
determines that an imported product from a WTO member country
has benefited from government subsidies and has materially injured
or threatens to materially injure a U.S. industry."8
A countervailing duty investigation is nearly identical to an
antidumping investigation. The investigation can be initiated either
by the administrative authority or by petition from an injured
domestic party.79 Before launching a full investigation, the DOC is
responsible for assessing the validity of the alleged material injury
due to the imported product, whereas the ITC determines the
likelihood that the imported product has received a countervailable
subsidy.'o If both preliminary determinations are affirmative, the
agencies will proceed to full investigations on both prongs and make
final determinations.8" The DOC will impose a countervailing duty
that equals the amount of the subsidy on the imported products only
if both the injury and the unfair subsidy are established.' If either
one of the preliminary determines is negative, the investigation will
be terminated.83
2. China's Currency Policy as a Form of Subsidy
Of the two prongs in a countervailing duty investigation, the
subsidy determination is the dispositive prong. Whereas the domestic
industries may rely on the trade deficit figures to support their injury
claim, the characterization of China's currency policy as a form of

76. Trade Act of 1930, supra note 60.
77. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b). The specific GATT provision on subsidies is Article
1994, art. XVI, supra note 53, available at
See, GAT
XVI.
<www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/analytic-index-e/gattl994_04_e.htm#articleX
VI>.
78. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (2004).
79. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a (2004).
80. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b (2004).
81. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d (a) & (b) (2004).
82. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d (c).
83. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a (c)(3).
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subsidy will undoubtedly fail under the current definition of a
countervailable subsidy.
The Trade Act describes a countervailable subsidy as a "specific"
subsidy that is "a financial contribution," "any form of income or
price support within the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT 1994,"
or "a payment to a funding mechanism to provide a financial
contribution" made by a government or its agents to "a person and a
benefit is thereby conferred."' The "specificity" requirement sets a
limit on the types of subsidy that may be considered as an unfair trade
practice. The key to the requirement test is that:
[A] subsidy is not specific as a matter of law, if (I) eligibility is
automatic; (II) the criteria or conditions for eligibility are strictly
followed, and (III) the criteria or conditions are clearly set forth in
the relevant statute, regulation, or other official document so as to
be capable of verification. 85
In short, only subsidies that "benefit an individual firm, industry, or
group of enterprises" are considered countervailable; "a government
program that benefits all industries" is not. 86
3. Prospectfor CountervailingDuty Rule
China's currency policy is an overarching program that, assuming
it is aimed at offering advantages to Chinese industries, benefits all
industries. Thus, the U.S. industries will fail to establish a claim
under the countervailing duty rule because they will not surmount the
specificity test that is essential to the countervailable subsidy
investigation.
D. Section 201 Safeguard
A third remedial option is provided by Section 201 of the Trade
Act of 1974 ' as amended. Section 201 is generally known as the
emergency safeguard for the protection of a domestic industry that
has suffered substantial injury from a sudden surge in foreign
imports.' This provision is a powerful unilateral tool against foreign

84. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) & (B).
85. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (5A)(D) (2004).
86. Stephen D. Cohen, et al., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY:
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, LAW, AND ISSUES 172 (2d ed. 2003).
87. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975)(Section
201)(codified as amended as 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251 et seq. (2004)).
88. Kelly Henry, Comment, Is the United States the World's Dumping Groundfor
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imports because it is technically consistent with Article XIX of the
GATT, 9 though any unilateral action by the United States may be
appealed through the WTO as the U.S. steel tariffs case has
illustrated.'
1. Overview of Section 201
Section 201

provides that

the U.S. President, upon

the

determination by the ITC that "an article is being imported.., in
such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious
injury ... to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly
competitive with the imported article," has the discretion to take

actions that "will facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to make a
positive adjustment to import competition and provide greater
economic and social benefits than costs."'" The ITC may initiate a

Section 201 investigation upon the petition of a private party, upon
the request of the President or a congressional committee, or on its
own accord. 92 The presidential actions may include the imposition of

a duty, a tariff-rate quota, or a quantitative restriction on the
importation of the article.93
Because Section 201 is a protectionist provision at odds with the
long-standing U.S. liberal trade policy, the ITC has historically
applied a strict standard in reviewing Section 201 petitions and "has
often ruled against the domestic petitioners." 94 In March 2002,
Steel? Recent Influxes in Steel Imports in the United States, the Effects, and the
PossibleRemedies, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L. 381,395-396, 401 (Winter 2003).
89. See
GATr
1994,
art.
XIX,
supra note
53,
available
at
<www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/analytic index-e/gatt99404e.htm#articleXI
X> (permitting a WTO member to impose temporarily restrictions on the imports of
a product if its domestic industry is injured or threatened with injury caused by a
surge in imports.).
90. After the United States unilaterally imposed steel tariffs against foreign
imports in March 2002, affected countries filed charges with the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) for mandatory consultation. In September 2003, the DSB
issued a final report ruling that the U.S. steel tariffs violated international trade law.
Under threat of retaliatory sanctions by trading partners, the Bush administration
announced in October 2003 that it would remove the tariffs. See WTO Panel Report
on U.S. Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (July 11,
2003), at <www.worldtradelaw.net> (visited Mar. 12, 2004); Appellate Body Report
on U.S. Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, AB2003-3 (Nov. 10, 2003), at <www.worldtradelaw.net> (visited Mar. 12, 2004).
91. 19 U.S.C. 2251(a).
92. 19 U.S.C. 2252(a)&(b) (2004).

93. 19 U.S.C. 2253(a)(3) (2004).
94.

COHEN,

supra note 86, at 154-155.
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however, President Bush imposed steel tariffs against foreign imports,
invoking the Section 201 safeguard protection.9 5 This decision
signaled a willingness by the current administration to support
Section 201 actions.
2. Application to Chinese Imports
Because Section 201 is structured to safeguard against surges in
the import of a specific product or line of products in an industry, it is
ill suited as a tool in support of sanctions against all imports from one
country.
Each petitioner must first show that it produces products that are
in direct competition with the imports to be investigated and that the
imports have increased significantly either "in absolute terms or as a
percentage of the domestic consumption."' 96 This means that in order
to establish a Section 201 case against all Chinese imports to warrant
a blanket tariff, the ITC must investigate every industry in which
Chinese goods are imported and conclude that the domestic industry
has been injured as a result of surges from corresponding Chinese
imports.
Based on the growing trade deficit between the United States
and China, it is likely that a number of manufacturing industries may
be able to present sufficient data to show huge increases in Chinese
imports over the last few years and the injury done to the domestic
producers of comparable goods. However, the ITC will be hardpressed to investigate every industry in which Chinese goods are
imported.
3. Prospectsfor Section 201
A closer look at the mechanism of the Section 201 safeguard
illustrates that it facilitates industry-specific protection, similar to the
antidumping law. Just as the antidumping law cannot be used against
all Chinese imports, neither can the Section 201 measures.
E. Section 301 Investigation
A companion measure to Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 as
amended is Section 301, which operates as an export remedial

95. See CNN/Europe, Bush Backs Steel Tariffs (Mar. 5, 2002) at
<edition.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/O3/O5/steel/index.html>(visited Mar. 12, 2004).
96. COHEN, supra note 86, at 155.
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measure by providing the United States the ability to act unilaterally
against perceived unfair foreign trade practices. 97 Section 301 has
been "successful in opening markets to the [U.S.] exporters and
investors around the world."98
1. Overview of Section 301
Section 301 is:
[T]he principal statutory authority under which the U.S. may
impose trade sanctions against foreign countries that maintain acts,
policies or practices that violate.., trade agreements, or are
unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict
U.S. commerce.99
Any interested party may petition the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) to initiate an investigation into a foreign country's alleged
USTR may selfviolation or unreasonable act. 1°' Additionally, the
1
country.
another
against
investigation
initiate an
In addition, Section 301 provides that the USTR must seek
consultation with the foreign government. 01 2 Also, if the investigation
involves an alleged violation of a trade agreement, such as an
agreement under the WTO, the USTR must follow the dispute
settlement provisions in that agreement. 3 In the event that the
USTR finds that "the rights of the United States under any trade
agreement are being denied" or the act or practice of the foreign
country is unjustifiable and burdens U.S. commerce, retaliation is
mandatory. ' ' On the other hand, if the practice is found to be
"unreasonable or discriminatory," the USTR has discretion in
imposing sanctions."

97. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (Section
301)(codified as amended as 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411 et. seq. (2004)).
98. Susana Hernandez Puente, Section 301 and The New WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding,2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP L. 213 (Fall 1995).
99. Office of Chief Counsel for International Commerce, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act (2001) (written by Jean Heilman
Grier), at <www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/301.html> (visited Mar. 6, 2004).
100. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a).
101. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b).
102. 19 U.S.C. § 2413.

103. Id.
104. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a).

105. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
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2. Application to China
While provisions of the GATT appear to be relevant, WTO
settlement procedures will be addressed later. Assuming there is no
applicable trade agreement, the USTR must determine whether
China's currency policy is unreasonable or discriminatory as it relates
to the United States.
"Unreasonable acts or practices" are defined as acts that, though
"not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent with the international
legal rights of the U.S.," are otherwise unfair and inequitable."' Such
acts include, but are not limited to, any acts that deny fair and
equitable opportunities to establish an enterprise or restrict fair
access of U.S. goods or services to the foreign market. 7
While China's tight currency control system poses difficulties to
foreign companies doing business in China, the stringent rules apply
equally to Chinese companies in restricting their ability to convert
RMB into foreign currencies. Thus, it may be difficult to argue that
U.S. companies operating in China have been discriminated against.
On the other hand, if the critics are correct in asserting that the
currency is undervalued, it would be clear that U.S. goods will
effectively be priced at a higher level for the Chinese market and thus
be less competitive. This would certainly put U.S. goods at a
disadvantage and limit access to the Chinese market.
The
determination of unreasonableness will thus depend on the USTR's
assessment of the value of RMB.
Should the USTR determine China's currency practice is
unreasonable and restricts U.S. commerce, it has discretion under
Section 301 either to impose retaliatory measures against Chinese
imports or to do nothing." Because the USTR's power to impose
sanctions is derived directly from the President's executive power,1°9 it
has to balance the interests of the administration in exercising such
discretion. While the Bush administration is motivated to help the
manufacturing sector which employs millions of workers in the
industrial states, it is also concerned with maintaining a working
relationship with China in order to get China's support for antiterrorism initiatives as well as other U.S. foreign policy objectives. It

106.
107.
108.
109.

19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3).
Id.
19 U.S.C. § 2411(c).
19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
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is not in the administration's interest to create an impasse with China
over a controversial trade issue. Therefore, the USTR may choose
not to impose retaliatory measures against Chinese imports.
3. Considerationsunder Section 301
Even if the USTR chooses to unilaterally apply sanctions, China
will certainly bring the matter in front of the WTO for consultation
and resolution. Thus, the USTR may find it most efficient to simply
seek the WTO consultation from the start.
V. Multilateral Option Through the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding
As discussed above, the unilateral legal approaches available to
the United States will either not work or will lead to an appeal to the
WTO by China. Since both the United States and China are members
of the WTO, the procedural and substantive law adopted in the
multitude of agreements under the WTO may offer a better
alternative for settling the dispute. Either country may initiate a
proceeding with the WTO dispute settlement system and the other
must follow."1
1. The WTO DSU Process
The process is established in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) and administered by the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB). ' First, the DSU sets up a preference for consultation,
mandating that members enter into consultation in good faith on
request and proceed along a strict timeline.' When consultation fails
to produce an agreement, the DSB is authorized to establish a panel
that will be responsible for holding hearings and issuing a report on
the dispute.'13
The panel reports are almost automatically adopted by the

110. Charles Tiefer, Sino 301: How Congress Can Effectively Review Relations
with China after WTO Accession, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 55, 67 (2001).
111. See WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
at
(1994),
Disputes
of
Settlement
<www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dsu-e.htm> (visited Mar. 6,2004).
112. J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 201 (3d ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1984) (citing DSU art. 4).
113. Id. at 205-208.
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DSB.14 Members disagreeing with the panel reports may then appeal
to the Appellate Body (AB), which will in turn issue an AB Report."5
Again, the AB Reports are usually adopted by the DSB."6 In
addition, the DSU puts strong emphasis on speedy decision-making
by setting deadlines for the issuance of the panel report and the AB
report."'
If a panel or the AB concludes that "a measure is
inconsistent with a covered agreement," it must recommend remedial
steps for the member concerned to conform with the agreement."8
Finally, the DSB will monitor the prompt compliance by the
member."9
As such, the DSU essentially "establishes a legal system that
functions like an international court."'2 ° It combines "short deadlines,
quasi-automatic procedures, and authority to issue binding decisions"
for the efficient administering of justice. 2'
This process offers a structured approach for the United States to
force changes on China in the event that the DSB agrees with the
United States on the illegality of China's currency policy. On the
other hand, should the DSB rule against the United States, it will not
have other legal means for pursuing this issue further.
2. Substantive Law Dealing with Exchange Arrangements
Since the complaints against China's currency practice center on
the manipulation of currency value, Article XV of the GATT on
exchange arrangements appears to be the most appropriate
substantive provision for the United States to rely on during the panel
proceeding.
The relevant provision in Article XV is found in paragraph 4,
which states:
[Clontracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the
intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the
intent of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the

114. Id. at 208.
115. Id. at 209.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 209-210.
118. Id. at 210.
119. Id.
120. Wei J. Lee, Comment, China and the WTO: Moving Toward Liberalizationin
China'sBanking Sector, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 481,484 (Spring 2003).
121. Id.
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International Monetary Fund."

A closer look at the Article reveals that the drafters intend the parties
in dispute to consult with the Fund regarding problems with the
Fund's jurisdiction. 23 In addition, the parties:
[S]hall accept all findings of statistical and other facts presented by
the Fund... and shall accept the determination of the Fund as to
whether action by a contracting party in exchange matters is in
accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the [Fund] .... 124
Thus, the Article creates an obligation on the WTO and its
members to consult with the Fund on specific matters, including
foreign exchange arrangements.12 5 Since the U.S. complaint against
China would fall under the foreign exchange arrangement category,
both parties would have to accept the Fund's findings.
3. Likely Outcome from Consultation with the Fund
Similar to the WTO, the Fund serves an important function in
facilitating international trade and economic growth by promoting
international monetary cooperation and exchange stability as well as
making its resources available to members experiencing balance of
payments difficulties. 126 The Fund consults with members, usually
every year, to assess their economic and financial policies." 7
In its 2004 report following consultation with China, the Fund
stated that "greater exchange rate flexibility remains in China's best
interest. 1 28 The report reflected disagreements among the Fund's
Directors with respect to China's foreign exchange policy. While
many Directors held the view that it would be "advantageous for

122. GATT
1994, art. XV
§ 4, supra note 53,
available
at
<www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/analytic-index e/gatt1994 06_e.htm#articleX

V>.
123. Id. at § 2.
124. Id.
125. Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund's
Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 561, 568-569
(July 2002).
126. IMF
Articles,
art.
I,
supra
note
18,
available
at
<www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa0l.htm>.
127. International Monetary Fund, IMF Surveillance, A Factsheet, at
<www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv.htm> (visited Mar. 6, 2004).
128. International Monetary Fund, IMF Concludes 2004 Article IV Consultation
with the People's Republic of China, PIN No. 04/99 (Aug. 25, 2004), at
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2004/pnO499.htm> (visited Oct. 22, 2004).
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China to make an initial move toward greater exchange rate
flexibility without undue delay," they "also emphasized the
importance of carefully sequencing such a move in relation to [other
financial measures] to ensure a successful exit from the current
exchange rate regime."12 9 The Directors approved China's "aim to
introduce, in a phased manner, greater exchange rate flexibility,"
recognizing that "the exact timing of such a change should be left to
[China] to decide." 130 Though the report does not include any finding
directly addressing the question of whether China's exchange policy
frustrates the intent of the Fund's Articles of Agreement, the
generally positive tone in the report shows the Fund is satisfied with
China's approach. 3'
On September 30, 2004, the managing director of the Fund told a
group of reporters in Washington, D.C. that "it would be to China's
advantage to uncouple the [RMB] from the dollar.', 132 This speech
again left open the timing for China to make its move. Thus, until the
Fund presents a clear timeline for foreign exchange reform in its
annual consultation with China, the United States has to assume that
it does not have strong support from the Fund on its argument that
China needs to either appreciate the RMB or float the currency
immediately.
4. Argument Based on Manipulation of Exchange Rates
The United States may try to argue that China violated Article
IV of the Fund's Articles of Agreement. The relevant provision
states that each member shall "avoid manipulating exchange rates or
the international monetary system in order to... gain an unfair
competitive advantage over other members.' ' 133 Together with Article
XV of the GATT, this provision calls for evidence to show that China
has used its exchange rate control system to help Chinese companies
gain unfair advantage over U.S. companies. However, there is a lack
of precedent under this provision, so it is unclear what kind of
evidence will satisfy the "manipulation" requirement.

129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Elizabeth Becker, I.M.F. Asks China to Free Its Currency from Dollar, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at C1.
available
at
§ 1, supra note
18,
133. IMF
Articles, art. IV
<www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa04.htm>.
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China will counter that it has maintained the same exchange rate
for a decade, so there is simply no evidence to support the claim that
it has manipulated its currency policy. China will also point out that
during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, China held its exchange rate
steady and helped stabilize the region, "despite being forced into an
uncompetitive export position and suffering internal deflationary
pressures."'' 34
This is further evidence that China has stayed
consistent with its exchange policy and has not engaged in currency
manipulation.
Since this is under the Fund's jurisdiction, the Fund will decide
whether China has manipulated its currency for unfair advantage.
Based on the 2004 consultation report, it is more likely that the Fund
will side with China.
5.Outlook on MultilateralOption
The analysis of the substantive international law on exchange
arrangements suggests that the United States does not have a strong
case against China. Thus, the United States should refrain from
invoking the WTO DSU process until it has developed a large body
of evidence in support of its argument that China's currency policy
violates the agreements of both the WTO and the Fund.
VI. Conclusion
Trade disputes among nations are generally much more complex
than the economic or legal considerations involved.
Political
considerations, for example, may dictate the actions taken.
As this note illustrates, the U.S. trade law, as it stands today, does
not provide a strong basis for challenging China's fixed exchange
policy. A unilateral sanction by the United States will likely not be
defensible in front of the WTO. On the other hand, if the U.S. goal is
limited to simply motivating China to enter into negotiations on the
currency issue, the threat of sanctions may be sufficient.
The WTO DSU can also bring the United States and China
together for consultation. However, neither country may prefer this
process because of the time pressure for reaching agreements or the
risk of an unfavorable, binding determination by the panel or the

134. Yang Jian & Melinda Moore, Renminbi: China to Maintain Stable RMB,
CBRC Tasked with Cleaning Up Finance Sector, EURoBIz MAGAZINE, July 2003,
available at <www.sinomedia.net/eurobiz/v2003O7/rmb.html>.
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Appellate Body. Thus, the United States will likely continue to voice
its objection to China's currency policy without taking any substantive
actions. China will continue consulting with the Fund on financial
policies, but will set its own timeline for moving towards currency
liberalization.
Although legal actions alone will most likely fail to deliver the
changes the United States desires, proceeding with such actions will
clearly demonstrate the U.S. political resolve in demanding changes
from China on its currency policy. The legal actions will serve as an
inducement for China to negotiate directly with the United States.
Therefore, in this trade dispute, legal actions will play an important,
but secondary, role in support of the diplomatic approaches the
United States adopts.
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